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INHERIT THE WHIRLWIND: THE ILLEGITIMATE CHILD AND
THE NEED FOR STATUTORY EQUAL PROTECTION
Less than twenty years ago, Justice Frankfurter commented on the
role of law in relation to children, saying:
Children have a very special place in life which law should reflect.
Legal theories and their phrasing in other cases readily lead to falla-
cious reasoning if uncritically tiansferred to determination of a State's
duty toward children.1
It would seem that illegitimate children are worthy of fair treatment
under the law as are other children, if only from a humanistic viewpoint.
The Fourteenth Amendment,2 which is more than a mere humanist
statement, is really a commandment that all persons are to be considered
as equal in the eyes of the law, and this concept includes children. As
Justice Frankfurter implied, legalistic perversions will occur and rise up
to harm children, if they are not protected. It is one such perversion of
the law which prevents the illegitimate child from participating equally
with legitimate children in intestate successions. The interests of society
are too great to permit such detrimental action against children, while
permitting the parents-especially the father, who is usually the ag-
gressor in the sexual relationship-to evade their societal and parental
duties. The interests of children cannot be relegated to a secondary posi-
tion behind social vengeance directed toward the immoral, and a child
must not be persecuted because of the unwillingness of the law to face
reality.
However, the disestablishment of illegitimates from the right to in-
herit is rooted deep in the antiquity of the common law, having been
settled even at the time of Bracton: "Illegitimates born of unlawful
intercourse, of persons between whom there could be no marriage, are
completely excluded from every benefit of secular law." 3 Even the lim-
itation implied by Bracton, as to illegitimates whose parents could have
lawfully wedded, seems to have disappeared by the time Lord Coke
wrote that "A BASTARD is in law quasi nullius filius, because he can-
not be heir to any." 4 This, of course, is the basis of Blackstone's oft-
repeated maxim that, as to the illegitimate, "[his] rights are very few,
being only such as he can acquire, for he can inherit nothing, being
looked on as the son of nobody . ... 5 The law of the twentieth cen-
tury, however, is still that of the thirteenth, except where limited by
legislative or once rare judicial action.6
1. May v. 'Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 535, 536 (1953) (Frankfurter concurring).
2. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, sec. 1. " ... nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jursi-
diction the eqal protection of the laws."
3. 2 Bracton, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae, f. 63 (S. Thorne trans. 1968).
4. Coke, Institutes *146.
5. W. Blackstone, Commentaries *458. Emphasis In original.
6. "Generally speaking, except in specific respects provided for by statute, a child born out
of wedlock is still nullius filius." Anonymous v. Anonymous, 174. Misc. 906, 22 N.Y.S.
2d598, 603 (1940). See also Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Thompson, 250
F. Supp. 476. 479 (E. D. Pa. 1966): "Perhaps the time will come when enlightened
legislators will remove the bar sinister. Perhaps someday there will be a legislative rec-
ognition that none of this is the fault of the child, who did not even ask to be born ille-
gitimate and to exist as the child of no one. But that day has not yet arrived .... "
In Cope v. Cope, 137 U.S. 682 (1891), one of the two cases concern-
ing illegitimate children prior to the 1960's,- the Court was asked to
invalidate a Utah Territorial statute which provided, contrary to com-
mon law, that mothers of illegitimate children and those illegitimate
children could inherit from the father as if legitimate, upon satisfaction
of paternity, by a competent court. Cope grew out of the Anti-Polygamy
Act of 1862,8 and led Justice Brown to state prophetically that
While this statute is an innovation upon the common law, and in
some particulars a novelty in legislation, we perceive no objection to
its validity .... [I]t may be said in defense of this act that the chil-
dren embraced by it are not responsible for this state of things, and
that it is unjust to visit upon them the consequences of their parents'
sins.... [T]o hold it to be invalid is to treat the child as in some
sense an outlaw. .... 9
In 1968, this view was enlarged upon in Levy v. Louisiana,'0 an ac-
tion by illegitimate children for the wrongful death of their mother.
Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas stated:
Why should the illegitimate child be denied rights merely because of
his birth out of wedlock? He certainly is subject to all the responsi-
bilities of a citizen, including the payment of taxes and conscription
under the Selective Service Act. How under our Constitutional regime
can he be denied rights which other citizens enjoy? 1 1
Following this concept, that illegitimates are not "non-persons," the
Court in Levy and the companion case of Glona v. American Guarantee
and'Life Insurance Co.12 ruled that the Equal Protection Clause pro-
hibited discrimination, at the very least in tort claims, on the basis of
illegitimacy.
The actual constitutional basis for the decision in Levy is clouded
by references to two different tests of equal protection: That utilized in
considering legislative enactments or state action in the realm of social
and economic activity-the police power-as in Morey v. Doud,13 and
that used in inspecting an alleged invasion of a basic civil right, as in
Skinner v. Oklahoma.14 The Morey test requires that "a statutory dis-
crimination must be based on differences that are reasonably related to
the purposes of the Act in which it is found." 15 The civil rights test is
far stricter, being concerned with the invocation of a basic civil right.
Thus,' strict scrutiny of the alleged invasion is necessary in order to
prevent either intentional or unintentional "invidious discriminations"
in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.)" In Skinner the right to
procreate was held to be basic; other cases have held that a basic civil
7. The other case was Stevenson's Heirs v. Sullivant, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 207 (1820).
8. 12 Stat. 501 (1862).
9. 137 U.S. at 684-685.
10. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
11. Id. at 71.
12. 391 U.S. 73 (1968),
13. 354 U.S. 457 (1957). The Morey test is found at 354 U.S. at 463-464.
14. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
15. 354 U.S. at 465.
16. 316 U.S. at 541.
46
right exists, among others, to vote,17 to marry,18 to have counsel at a
criminal trial,' to travel, 20 and to get an education. 21 Moreover, certain
general classifications are inherently suspect, requiring close and careful
examination. 22 In both situations the Court has applied the test that
where "the classification touches on [a] fundamental right . . . , its
constitutionality must be judged by the stricter standard of whether it
promotes a compelling statei interest." 23
Thus, the crucial question is whether Levy and Glona depended upon
the "rational basis" test, or on the "compelling state interest" standard.
24
For before the right of the illegitimate can be protected, the nature and
seriousness of those rights must be ascertained. Because of the confused
application of the law in Levy and Glona, much confusion has been gen-
erated as to the status of the rights of illegitimates. 25 It is submitted,
however, that at least inferentially Levy required the conclusion that a
classification based on illegitimacy is constitutionally suspect, and that
if no compelling state interest can be demonstrated to require approval
of such statutory classifications, that classification must fail.26
However, the vitality of Levy has been seriously undermined, and its
application severely limited by Labine v. Vincent, 91 S. Ct. 1017 (1971).
In Labine, the decedent, Ezra Vincent, was survived only by alleged col-
lateral relations, and an illegitimate Negro daughter, who had been
formally acknowledged as Vincent's daughter in compliance with Louisi-
ana law.2 7 The daughter, through her natural tutrix, sought to inherit
on the same basis as a legitimate child, and that the relevant state stat-
utes unconstitutionally violated the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses. 28 The U'.S. Supreme Court ruled, in affirming the lower state
courts, that "absent a specific constitutional guarantee" 29 the fact that
regulation of successions is a reserved state power does not permit the
Supreme Court to invalidate such laws.3 0 Much emphasis was placed
upon the fact that there was a supposedly insurmountable barrier in Levy
17. Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533 (1964); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
18. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
19. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353
(1963).
20. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
21. Id. at 633 (dictum).
22. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation): Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483 (1954)(race); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633(1948) (ancestry); Dou-
glas v. California, supra (economic status).
23. Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, at 638.. Emphasis In original.
24. See Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 Mich. L. Rev. 477 at 487 (1967);
Comment, The Expanding Rights of the Illegitimate, 3 Creighton L. Rev. 135 (1969);
Note, 21 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 292 (1970). Note, 35 Brooklyn L. Rev. 135 (1968).
25. Strahan v. Strahan, 304 F. Supp. 40 (W. D. La. 1969) (rational basis); It. v. R., 431
S.W.2d 152 (Mo. 1968) and Estate of Jensen, 162 N.W.2d 861 (N. D. 1969) (com-
pelling state interest).
26. Levy v. Louisiana. supra, at 71-72:
Howevfer that may be. we have been extremely sensitive when it comes to basic
civil rights [citing cases], and have not hesitated to strike down an Invidious
classification .... Why should the illegitimate child be denied rights because of
his birth out of wedlock? . . . Legitimacy or illegitimacy of birth has no rela-
tion to the nature of the wrong allegedly inflicted on the mother. . . . We con-
clude that it Is invidious to discriminate against them when no action, conduct,
or demeanor of theirs is possibly relevant to the harm that was done the mother.
27. L.S.A. Civil Code art. .203.
28. L.S.A. Civil Code arts. 202, 206, 919.
29. 91 S.Ct. at 1021.
30. Id.
to recovery by illegitimates. Such does not exist in the field of succes-
sions. Thus Vincent's daughter could have inherited "had he bothered
to follow formalities of executing a will."1
3 1
The decision in Labine was bitterly opposed by the four dissenters,
speaking through Justice Brennan 32 on several grounds. First, noted
Justice Brennan, the Court impliedly stated that state action could not
be regulated merely because it was action in a sphere in which a state
may act.3 3 For example, a state has full power to regulate education, but
that is not to say that state-required segregation is permissible merely
because it is the exercise of an admitted state power. As Justice Brennan
pointedly noted,
It is precisely state action which is subjected by the Fourteenth
Amendment to its restraints. It is to say the least bewildering that a
court that for decades has wrestled with the nuances of the concept
of "state action" . . . in this case holds that the state action here,
because it is state action, is insulated from these restraints.
34
In so noting, Justice Brennan highlighted the most vulnerable point of the
Labine decision: That it is "unprincipled" in the sense that there is no
constitutional principle to support it.
Justice Brennan further discussed the concept of "biological distinct-
tion" first developed in Levy, in which it was noted that an illegitimate
was biologically no different than a legitimate. Despite the Labine Court's
distinction that a concubine and a wife are alike biologically yet different
socially, 35 and analogizing from that to the differences between a bastard
and a legitimate, the dissent noted that the biological test should be
continued.3
6
The majority further placed great weight upon the fact that Louisi-
ana, because of its Civilian jurisprudence, places great emphasis on the
ordering of familial relationships; some relations are legal and empha-
sized, and others are legally ostracized. 37 It is this concept which is at
once the most beguiling, in that obviously a state should foster public
morality, which is the most disturbing in its impact. For the general
premise that public morality must be served does not justify, at the very
least, irrational inroads upon personal rights; at the most, such infringe-
ments of personal rights are to be allowed only upon a showing of strong
interests of the state. Specifically, the Labine Court refused to note the
legal implications of their decision in four different but related spheres:
(1) Such a classification violates equal protection of a fundamental
human right to belong to a family; 38
(2) Such a classification is made on the impermissible basis of an-
cestry ;39
31. Id.
32. 91 S.Ct. at 1022.
33. 91 S.Ct. at 1025-26.
34. 91 S.Ct. at 1026.
35. 91 S.Ct. at 1020-21.
36. 91 S.Ct. at 1027.
37. 91 S.Ct. at 1021.
38. See text at page 7, Infra.
39. See text at page 8, Infra.
(3) This classification operates. as a vehicle for racial discrimina-
tion; 40 and
(4) Sanctions on the basis of a status over which the members of a
class have no control are not permitted.
41
There is no state interest in such classifications, moreover, which can be
asserted so as to sustain such a classification.
42
I. Children, Marriage, and the Right to a Family.
While "there is no federal law of domestic relations," 43 the Supreme
Court has sanctioned the application of state law in resolving such ques-
tions. But the importance of the right to have a family has been held to
be paramount to state law, where necessary: "The freedom to marry has
long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." 44 But if it is proper to heed
the needs of children, to the point where "sin" may not be punished at
their expense, 45 and to judicially note the right to marry, as in Loving,
it is apparent that the next logical step is to recognize the right to have
parents, especially a father. Even more than a wife or a husband, parents
are "vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness." 46
This concept is inherent in the Levy decision: An illegitimate mother is
nonetheless a mother, despite the illegitimacy of the children. Similarly
and inescapably, a child is irretrievably related to its father. Sociologi-
cally, this concept is well established: "[N] o child should be brought
into the world without a man-and one man at that-assuming the role
of sociological father." 47 It has even been suggested that the purpose of
marriage is "not the legitimation of sex, but the legitimation of parent-
hood." 4 18 The very right to have a father is recognized, as to a child
born in wedlock; it is even recognized to the benefit of the child born
out of adultery. 49 Thus, the presumption of legitimacy of children born
during a marriage of the mother has been stated in Louisiana courts to
be "the strongest presumption known in law." 50 Not only does this pre-
sumption limit the sources of family conflict, but it also protects children
by conferring upon them a father by judicial fiat.,
If it is a basic civil right of the adulterous bastard to have a family,
51
40. See text at page 11, lnri.
41. See text page 17, infra.
42. See text at page 18, infra.
43. DeSylva v. Ballantyne, 351 U.S. 570. 580 (1956).
44. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12.
45. 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
46. Loving v. Virginia, supra.
47. Mallnowski, Parenthood, The Basis of Social Structure, in The New Generation 137 (V.
Calverton & S. Schmalhausen eds. 1930).
48. Goode, Illegitimacy In the Caribbean, in Readings in Modern Sociology 158 (A. Inkeles
ed. 1966).
49. See e.g. Murphy v. Houma Well Service, 413 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1969); George v. Ber-
trand, 217 So.12d 47 (La. App. 1968); Feazel v. Feazel, 222 La. 113, 62 So.2d 119
(1952). See also Succession of Soloy, 44 La.Ann. 433, 10 So. 872, 876:
The sanctity with which the law surrounds marital relations and the regulation
and good fame of the spouse and of the children born during the marriage is
of such inviolability that the mother and the children can never brand them-
selves with declarations of adultery, illegitimacy, and bastardy, and their true
character is not permitted lightly to be thus aspersed, however true in them-
selves the stern and odious facts may be.
50. Id.
51. See Y.B. 32-3 Edw. I p. 63 (Selden Society ed.) for an anachronism that continues to
the present day, as in cases cited in note 49.
49
how can it be said that all other illegitimates have no right to a family
relationship including a father? Both kinds of children should have an
equal right to a father and a mother, for the right to a family is one of
the most elemental rights a man can possess. 52 More important even than
the right to citizenship in the nation 53 is the right to citizenship in the
family.
II. Discrimination on Grounds of Ancestry.
Illegitimates are punished for the criminal acts, such as fornication,
of their parents. So stated, such action is closely analogous to the com-
mon-law corruption or attaint of blood,53 whereby the attaintee could
neither inherit nor be inherited from. Such a person was an illegitimate
testator: "[B] y an anticipation of his punishment, he is already dead in
law." Although his children were not considered illegitimate, the same
consequences attached to them as if they were. The same is true of ille-
gitimate children today, for when born out of wedlock they suffer the
legal effects of a limited corruption of their parent's blood, for they can-
not inherit from them. In reality, it may be said that there are no illegi-
timate children, only illegitimate parents, 50 who, like the attained felon,
cause their children to suffer for their sins. Thus, there is a discrimina-
tion on the basis of a taint in the parents' blood, depriving the child of
the right to inherit because of his parents' promiscuity. This discrimina-
tion is also better described as one based on ancestry, for the discrimina-
tion depends on who the child's parents were.
Absent exigent circumstances that compel such discrimination, such
action is impermissible. In both Hirabayashi v. United States5 7 and
Korematsu v. United States 5.s the Court permitted directives of the West-
ern Military District regarding curfew and relocation of resident Japa-
nese and American citizens of Japanese ancestry in the early days of
World War II. But in the process the Court evinced considerable dis-
taste for such actions:
Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by
their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are found-
52. Compare Skinner v. Oklahoma, supra, and Loving v. Virginia, supra, with Labine v.
Vincent, supra, (Brennan dissenting) at 1030-1031:
Given the importance and nature of the decision to marry, cf. Boddie v. Con-
necticut, 400 U.S. 91 S.Ct. 780. 27 L.Ed.2d .......... (1971), I think that dis-
enheriting the illegitimate child must he held to "bear no intelligible proper
relation to the consequences that are made to flow" from the State's classifica-
tion. Glona v. American Guarantee Co., 391 U.S. 73, 81, 88 S.Ct. 1512, 1514-
1515, 20 L.Ed.2d 441 (1968)(Harlan, J., dissenting).
53. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
54. See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 334 (Douglas, J., concurring); George Campbell Paint-
ing Corp. v. Reid. 392 U.S. 286, 289 (1968)(Douglas, J.. concurring). See also The
Supreme Court's Bill of Attainder Doctrine: A Need for Clarification, 54 Col.L.Rev. 212,
213-214 (1966).
55. W. Blackstone, Commentaries *380.
56. See e.g. Saks v. Saks, 198 Misc. 667, 71 N.Y.S.2d 797 (1947); Woodward's Estate.
230 Cal.App. 113, 40 Cal.Rptr. 781 (1964).
57. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
58. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
ed upon the doctrine of equality.5 9
Justice Jackson, dissenting in Korematsu, rejected the validity of the "re-
location" as "an attempt to make an otherwise innocent act a crime merely
because this prisoner is the son of parents as to whom he had no
choice . .."69 Thus, only a compelling reason such as national emer-
gency or war could justify discrimination on grounds of ancestry. Such
a reason was lacking in Oyama v. California.6' In that case the California
Alien Land Law prohibited ownership of farm land by aliens ineligible
for citizenship. Petitioner was the infant son of such an alien, who bad
purchased the land in his son's name. The Supreme Court refused to
allow the land to escheat to the state, as provided by the Alien Land Law,
on the grounds that the son was being punished for the father's fault in
being an ineligible alien. It is perhaps significant that the Court, in
Korematsu, Hirabayasbi, and Oyama, spoke primarily in terms of "an-
cestry" and not in terms of "national origin." Thus, what may have
seemed to be limited to situations involving discrimination on grounds
of national origin was broadened to prohibiting discrimination on the
basis of ancestry, including the concept of national origin.
Thus, differentiation on the basis of ancestry may be considered a
penumbral concept prohibiting discrimination against a person because
of his condition of birth, be it racial,0 2 ancestral, 3 or biological.6 4 All
of these perpetuate, unless prevented, prejudice against a person for a
condition he did not choose. This point was critically examined by Jus-
tice Brennan, who approved such conclusions, in citing Hirabayasbi and
noting:
It is certainly unusual in this country for a person to be legally dis-
advantaged on the basis of factors over which he had no control.6 5
As Justice Brennan notes, Labine is unusual; it may almost be termed a
judicial anomaly in light of the case law developed after Levy. While
few courts did more than intone "equal protection" in following Levy,
because of its unclear decisional basis, several state courts pointedly re-
fused to allow limitations on an illegitimate's rights, on grounds of
ancestry.66 . Progress in this area has been largely due to more humani-
tarian ideals; in Armijo v. Wesselius,6 7 the Supreme Court of Washington
ruled, before Levy, that:
Society is becoming progressively more aware that children deserve
59. Hirabayashl v. United States. supra, at 100. See also concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
Murphy at 320 U.S. 109. 110-111:
The result [of this case] is the creation in this country of two classes of citizens
for the purpose of a critical and perilous hour---to sanction discrimination be-
tween.groups of United States citizens on the basis of ancestry. In my opinion
this goes to the very brink of constituional power.
60. 323 U.S. at 242.
61. 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
62. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
63. Hirabayashi v. United States, supra.
64. Glona v. American Guarantee and Life Insurance Co., supra.
65. 91 S.Ct. at 1030.
66. Armijo v. Wesselius. 73 Wash.2d 716, 440 P.2d 471 (1968); see also Saks v. Saks,
supra; Estate of Jensen. supra, Woodward's Estate, supra.
67. Armijo v. Wesselius. supra.
proper care, comfort, and protection even if they are illegitimate. The
burden of illegitimacy in purely social relationships should be enough,
without society adding unnecessarily to the burden with legal impli-
cations having to do with the care, health, and welfare of children.
6 8
This observation is especially pertinent; to discriminate on the basis of
ancestry, that is, that one's parents performed illegal acts, is ill-founded
enough, for it operates to deny a child the right to be free from punish-
ment for acts he did not commit. But to discriminate on the basis of
ancestry so as to deny a child the necessities of life, through succession
to his father's estate, is damning. It is as critical and invidious as racial
discrimination, for by its very nature it renders a child less capable of
social maturity in a complex society. Both may have profoundly harmful
effects on the child, who is incapable of remedying his social stigma.
At the very least, if society is not yet mature enough to refuse to punish
children for their parents' acts, the law should be.
IHl. Racial Discrimination and Illegitimacy.
As noted above, there is a strong similarity in the effect on a child
of ancestral discrimination and the effect of racial discrimination. This
may not be a chance coincidence; the fact is that today illegitimacy is a
racial problem. The Negro population, comprising approximately ten per
cent of the national population,P has more than one and one-fifth as
many illegitimate births in number as were born to the white popula-
tion.70 Subsequent adoption, which legitimizes the child, takes place in
about seventy per cent of the white illegitimacy cases; for Negroes the
comparable figure is between three and five per cent.71 Over two-thirds
of all illegitimate children will thus remain illegitimate.. Of that group,
more than eighty per cent are black. Considered as a whole, the problem
of illegitimacy and its disabilities falls at least twenty times more severely
on Negroes than it does on whites.7 2 What appears on its face to be a
neutral classification, status of birth, becomes in effect significantly racial
in nature.
There are grounds for supposing that this effect may be part of a
historical design to discriminate against the Negro. While it is not. here
suggested that legislators today intend the particular end of maximizing
the disabilities of racial minorities, the problem of illegitimacy among
blacks may be a direct result of the black codes and slave laws of the
68. 73 Wash.2d at ...... 440 P.2d at 473.
69. 1970 World Almanac 356. The population percentage for Negroes was 8%. but In view
of higher birth rates for Negroes, an approximation of 10% would seem appropriate.
70. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Department of Labor, Report No. 375, The Social and
Economic Status of Negroes in the United States 77 (1969);U.S. Bureau of the Census,
Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 49. 50 (1970).
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the rate of illegitimacy among both blacks
and whites Is accelerating. In 1940 the rate was 16.8% of all live births among blacks.
In 1967 It was 29.4%. Bureau of the Census data show that in 1968 there were 339,000
live illegitimate births, of which 183,900 (54+%) were black. It is interesting to note
that this means that while something like 5% of all white births are Illegitimate, an
epidemic 31% of all Negro births are.
71. U.S. Bureau of Public Assistance, Department of Health. Education and Welfare, Ille-
gitinmacy and Its Impact on the Aid to Dependent Children Program 35-36 (1960).
72. Applying adoption figures, 1.5% of white children will not be legitimated by birth in
wedlock or subsequent adoption; 29% of blacks will remain illegitimate.
antebellum South. Slaves, comprising the majority of the black popula-
tion, were then considered either to be real or chattel property.73 Being
property, slaves were incapable of contracting marriage, except where it
was possible with the consent of the master." Thus, they were effectively
deprived of the opportunity for any family relationship whatsoever.
75
Additionally, it appears that slaves and Free Negroes were even beyond
the pale of enforcible morality: In Virginia, penalties were assessable
for polygamy only against whites,76 only whites were forbidden by law
to marry within certain degrees of affinity, 77 and "open and gross lewd-
ness and lasciviousness" was an offense contrary to public policy only if
whites were involved. 78. Adultery and fornication were criminal only as
to free persons. 79 The Negro was usually allowed immorality where he
had the choice; most often he did not have the choice and regardless of
his wishes was compelled to live as a non-moral object. The two hundred
and forty-six years of slavery in the United States may have indeed so
ingrained illegitimacy and so-called "immortality" into the structure of
Negro domestic relations as to render a massive black illegitimacy prob-
lem inevitable. Such is the case today; it is significant that the parties
involved in Levy and Labine are black. One hundred years after the
abolition of slavery, illegitimacy remains as a badge of servitude for the
Negro. In a recent case, Jones v. Mayer Co.,80 the Supreme Court said:
For this court recognized long ago that, whatever else they may have
encompassed, the badges and incidents of slavery-its "burdens and
disabilities"-included restraints upon "those fundamental rights
- which are the essence of civil freedom, namely, the same right .. .
to inherit, purchase, lease, sell and convey property, as is enjoyed
by white citizens." Civil Rights Cases .... 81
Continuation of the effects of slavery on the parental structure of the
Negro family, in order to frustrate the admitted 'same right to inherit
as whites,' would be to permit the very modes of discrimination that the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments were intended to root out of
the law. It is in this respect that the Labine decision is so unfortunate;
for the cases are legion 82 which hold that discriminatory state action,
regardless of the power of the state to act generally in that field, is con-
73. Goodell, The American Slave Code (1853) (Arno Press and N.Y. Times reprint 1969)
23-42. While a prominent abolitionist tract of its era, it does describe the state of the
law concerning slaves in the pre-Civil. War South.
74. Id. at 104-112. See also Code of Alabama, title 5, chap. 5, art. I, sec. 1946 (1852):
"Marriages may be solemnized between free white persons, or between free persons of
color . . ."; Louisiana Civil Code. art. 182 (1838): "Slaves cannot marry without the
consent of their masters, and their marriages do not produce any of the civil effects
which result from such contracts." See also generally Revised Statutes of Missouri, Chap.
115 (1845); Code of Virginia, Chap. 108 (1860); Statute Laws of Tennessee, "Mar-
riage" 1741, Chap. 1, sec. 7 (1836); Revised Code of North Carolina, Chap. 107, sec.
61 (1855).
75. Goodell. supra, at 112-113. See also Louisiana Civil Code, art. 183 (1838): "Children
born of a mother then in a state of slavery, whether married or not, follow the condi-
tion of their mother; they are consequently slaves and belong to the master of their
mother."
76. Code of Virginia, Chap. 196, see. 1 (1860),
77. Id., see. 2.
78. Id., sec. 6.
79. Id., sec. 7.
80. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
81. 392 U.S. at 441. Emphasis added.
82. See e.g. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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stitutionally impermissible. Yet in Labine the Court stated that since the
legislature has the power to make laws relating to intestate successions,
only a specific constitutional guarantee can invalidate the state law. The
fallacy in the reasoning is that denial of equal protection violates a
specific guarantee. In failing to examine the rationality of the state ac-
tion, the Labine decision utterly neglects to attempt to discover whether
there was a violation. Indeed, it appears that the Court reasoned that
state action in itself was rational, or otherwise it would be unconstitu-
tional, and since it must have been rational, there was no need to examine
it for its constitutionality. Such cyclical sophistry is unfortunate.
It may be suggested, however, that there is no indication of inten-
tional discrimination in the law of succession on the grounds of race, and
that consequently there is no discrimination because of the reserved right
of the states to legislate in the area of successions. There is some sub-
stance to this argument, since the Louisiana Civil Code, derived from
the Code Napoleon of 1804, much antedated the emancipation of the
southern blacks in 1864. s 3 The fallacy of this argument is that a law
valid on its face may be still discriminatory in operation. In striking down
the Oklahoma "grandfather clause" in 1915, the Supreme Court recog-
nized this point, saying,
It is true [that the Oklahoma statute] contains no express words of
an exclusion from the standard which it establishes of any person on
account of race . . . but the standard itself inherently brings that re-
sult into existence .... 84
Justice Frankfurter also commented on the seemingly nondiscriminatory
law in Lane v. Wilson s5 when he observed that "[t]he Amendment
nullifies sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of discrimina-
tion." 86 Such is obviously the situation in the case of intestate succession;
sophisticated and seemingly neutral on its face, in operation it perpetu-
ates the unequal treatment of Negroes who, overwhelmingly, are the
class of illegitimates affected. Judge Wisdom, of the Fifth Circuit, point-
edly noted the role of the courts in examining such racially oriented
statutes; in holding the Louisiana "constitutional interpretation test" in-
valid, as a precondition to voter registration, he suggested that "[t] he
legislative purpose and inevitable effect of a law non-discriminatory on
its face may be decisive in determinating the unconstitutionality of a
law." 7 That in effect the succession statutes are discriminatory is ob-
vious: Where one black child in four born each year is denied the right
to inherit from its father, while less than one white child in twenty-five
is so affected,8 8 a prima facie case of racial discrimination is made out. '"
83. See note 28, supra.
84. Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 364 (1915); see also Gomillion v. Lightfoot,
364 U.S. 339 (1960).
85. 307 U.S. 268 (1939).
86. Id. at 275.
87. Louisiana v. United States. 225 F.Supp. 353, 362 (D.W.La. 1963), aff'd 380 U.S. 145
(1965).
88. See data at note 70, supra.
89. See e.g. Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 11969).
As Judge Wisdom noted, legislative purpose often plays a significant
role in ascertaining the constitutionality of a statute. This has been inter-
preted in the past to mean that discriminatory intent is necessary to in-
validate laws as violative of the Equal Protection Clause.90 But the role
of intent has lessened as an essential prerequisite, becoming rather an
indicator of discrimination which supplements other indicia of unequal
treatment. In the case of Hobsen v. Hansen,91 Judge J. Skelly Wright
eloquently affirmed this change:
Orhodox equal protection doctrine can be encapsulated in a single
rule: governmental action which without justification imposes un-
equal benefits is unconstitutional. The complaint that analytically no
violation of equal protection vests unless the inequalities stem from a
deliberately discriminatory plan is simply false. Whatever the law was
once, it is a testament to our maturing concept of equality that, with
the held of Supreme Court decisions in the last decade, we now
firmly recognize that the arbitrary quality of thoughtlessness can be
as disastrous to private rights and the public interests as the per-
versity of a willful scheme.
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Indeed, it appears that a form of inferred intent is to be found from
the surrounding facts where specific intent is lacking. Where the socio-
economic conditions of Negroes are demonstrably due to past discrimina-
tion, resulting in their inability to meet standards which whites are gen-
erally capable of meeting, a de facto discrimination has been held to
exist.93 In Gaston County v. United States,94 a state voting literacy test
was struck down, with the Supreme Court noting that it was reasonable
to assume that whites would always succeed in literacy more often and
with greater ease than blacks, due to the past history of discrimination
in education. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,95 Chief Justice Burger simi-
larly rejected the use of employment advancement tests and requirements
of educational attainment for job promotions on the grounds that if
Negroes fared badly on such tests, it is due to prior educational discri-
mination, even lacking discriminatory administration of the tests and
qualifications. From these cases it is manifest that lack of discriminatory
intent is irrelevant where present inequality in treatment of minority
groups grows out of past patterns of discrimination and the resulting
curtailment in economic, cultural, and educational development.
Seen in this context, the discriminatory use of intestacy statutes can-
not be allowed. It is thus unfortunate that the Supreme Court has not
analyzed the effect of such laws, for while it may, conceivably, be "ra-
90. Snowden v. Hughes. 321 U.S. 1 (1944). But see United States ex rel. Seals v. Wiman,
304 F.2nd 53. 65 (5th Cir. 1962): "It is not necessary to go so far as to establish ill
will, evil motive, or absence of good faith, but that objective results are largely to be
relied on in the application of the constitutional test."
91. 269 F.Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub nom. Schmuck v. Hobson, 132 U.S.App.D.C.
372, 408 F.2nd 175 (1969).
92. 269 F.Supp. at 497. Accord, Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395
F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968): Local 189, United Papermakers and Paperworkers, AFL-CIO
v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. den. 379 U.S. 919 (1970); Haw-
kins v. Town of Shaw.... F.2d .... (5th Cir. 1971); Arrington v. Massachusetts Bay
Transportation Authority, 306 F.Supp. 1355 (D. Mass 1969).
93. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Gaston County v. United States,
supra; Arrington v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority, supra.
94. Supra.
95. 401 U.S. at 424 (1971).
tional" to discriminate between concubinage and marriage, such a
seemingly rational discrimination cannot stand when it effects a racial
discrimination against children.
IV. Discrimination Because o an Unavoidable Status.
There is growing authority for the proposition that people should
not be punished when "no action, conduct, or demeanor of theirs is
possibly relevant." 90 Such persons are generally those who are helpless
to prevent their condition, and indeed may never have entered it volun-
tarily. The most common class of situations previously embraced by this
concept have been discriminations on account of race,9 7 ancestry,9 8 and
economic condition.99
Levy and Glona extended this inquiry into the problem of illegitimacy
when Justice Douglas refused to allow a state to prevent institution of
wrongful death actions because of the illegitimacy of the injured party.100
Two states have similarly ruled that discrimination on account of status
of birth is impermissible. 10 4 In Dickerson'v. Texas Employers' Insurance
Association, a child who could not have prevented his adoption prior to
its natural father's death was held to have a right to share in workmen's
compensation benefits, the court saying:
We consider the discrimination between the two classes of children in
the case at bar to be "invidious" because the effect of it is to take
from a defenseless child a substantial right .... not because of any-
thing the child did, but wholly because of the act of one or more
adults in adopting the child.
102
Thus, the court found that the uncontrollable status of a child should
not prevent him from sharing in rights he would normally have benefited
in. Similarly, in Estate of Jensen, the North Dakota Supreme Court, in
invalidating prohibition of intestate succession to or through illegitimates,
minced few words in stating:
This statute, which punishes innocent children for their parents'
transgressions, has no place in our system of government, which has
as one of its basic tenets equal protection for all. 10 3
It is unconscionable, as the North Dakota court recognizes, for a state to
effectively outlaw a child from a share in his father's estate, since such
is effectuating a penalty upon the child for his status. Since the child can
never change that status, he can never avoid the punishment, nor can he
even mitigate it. To allow such actions on the part of a state cannot be
deemed rational. Whatever else might be wrong with illegitimacy, a
96. Levy v. Louisiana, suprs6 at 72.
97. See text at page 11.
98. See text at page 8.
99. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956): Boddle v. Connecticut, 400 U.S. ____ (1971).
100. See text at n. 96, supra.
101. Dickerson v. Texas Employers' Insurance Association, 451 S.W.2d 794 (1970) (work-
men's compensation); Estate of Jensen, supra (intestate succession).
102. 451 S.W.2d at 797.
103. 161 N.W.2d at 878.
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state should not irrationally punish a status cause by third parties. 104
V. State Interests and Illegitimacy.
Violation of a fundamental right by a state carries the obligation on
the part of the government to show a "compelling interest" to justify
the intrusion. 105 A regulatory classification, of course, need only be based
upon a "rational" basis. Regardless of whether the right to inherit is
considered "basic" or merely incidental, 106 there are no justifying rea-
sons for the discrimination against illegitimates in the field of successions
as they are treated now.
One leading argument in favor of such restrictions on illegitimates
is that they encourage marriage, which is a permissible area of state regu-
lation. Should the bastard be treated equally with the legitimate child,
the argument runs, marriage is weakened since no advantage remains to
be derived from it. Absent the social stigma of illegitimacy, fewer parents
would give their union the permanency that marriage provides. This
reasoning, however valid, falls on the grounds that restrictions by a state
must not be broader than necessary to achieve the desired objective. 19 7
Rather than broadly disinherit illegitimates, a sweeping process reminis-
cent of killing a fly with a sledgehammer, limited and more carefully
enforced means already exist, such as penal sanctions for fornication and
adultery, which, if vigilantly enforced, would provide strong disencen-
tives for avoiding marriage via illicit sexual unions.
Perhaps the most telling counter-argument against the argument that
such restrictions encourage marriage is the converse argument: If the
bastard is not given the same rights as the legitimate child, marriage is
weakened since the father incurs no duties to transmit sufficient wealth
to provide for the child, thereby allowing the father to treat his wealth
however he wishes, regardless of the child. Even if the father has a statu-
tory duty to support the child, his obligations end with the father's
death, while they are perpetuated for his legitimate offspring. The law
should not allow a father to shirk his parental duty in the name of
"encouraging marriage." Thus, while the state may have an "interest in
promoting family life" '0 it cannot be said to be rational for the state
to thereby frustrate marriage by providing benefits to the father who re-
fuses to marry and legitimate his children.
Justice Brennan in Labine directly noted this discrepancy. Moreover,
104. "This Court has generally treated as suspect a classification which discriminates against
an individual on the basis of factors over which he has no control." Labine v. Vincent,
supra, at 1027 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
105. Dunham v. Plsifer, 312 F.Supp. 411 (D. Vt. 1970):
A regulatory classification which, in addition to the creation of differential
treatment, serves to penalize the exercise of a fundamental right must be justi-
fied by a compelling governmental interest. The operational difference is that
the court will invalidate a classification which infringes upon a separate fun-
damental right unless the classification is shown to be necessary in the service
of some compelling state interest, rather than just rationally related to some
permissible state Interest. . . . The "compelling state Interest" standard of
"active review" calls upon the state to show more than a link of reasonable-
ness. The state must demonstrate the pressing importance of the classification
in the context of some necessary governmental objective.
106. See text at n. 81, supra.
107. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
108. 91 S.Ct. at 1019 n. 6. See also 91 S.Ct. at 1027 n. 18.
he differentiated between encouraging marriage, as an institution between
a husband and a wife, and encouragement of marriage at the expense of
third parties such as children. 109 He also noted the fallacy in the argu-
ment, saying:
Such [discrimination] could encourage marriage only if fathers gener-
ally desire to leave property to their illegitimate children; otherwise,
disenheritance would not operate as a sanction to encourage mar-
riage.110
These considerations also are similar to the objections to the argu-
ment that discouraging promiscuity supports disenheritance of illegiti-
mates. However, while this objective may be laudatory, it is ineffective;
in the period 1940 to 1968, the rate for illegitimacy has more than tri-
pled, from 7.1 per 1000 births to 24.1.111
Moreover, the conflicting state action in this area defeats the assump-
tion that punishing illegitimacy prevents promiscuity. As mentioned
above, 112 one of the strongest presumptions of the law is that any child
born to a married woman is legitimate. 113 If the policy of the law in
discouraging promiscuity is to be consistent, it would seem that the state
would attempt to illegitimatize the adulterous bastard as well as the ille-
gitimate born out of fornication. It may be answered that the even strong-
er policy of the state in encouraging family stability overrides such a con-
sistent system. Yet such does not agree with the fact that every state al-
lows divorce on grounds of adultery. The answer is that the state does
not wish to promote family stability so much as prevent the illegitimatiz-
ing of such children born in adultery. 114 If the state will not punish
promiscuity within marriage, at the expense of the children involved,
why can it be said to be rational to punish promiscuity at the expense of
similarly situated innocent children?
Moreover, "people contemplating sexual intercourse probably do not
have intestacy statutes on their minds." "5 While it is laudable for a state
to attempt to prevent promiscuity, such sweeping and boundless statutes
that harm only children and do not punish the parents for their essen-
tially criminally immoral behavior are absurd. In a similar connection,
Justice Douglas voiced his disapproval of such measures:
In other words, the Alabama regulation is aimed at punishing moth-
109. 91 S.Ct. at 1028.
110. 91 S.Ct. at 1029.
111. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United
States 50 (1971).
112. See text at page 8.
113. See note 50, supra.
114. In Murphy v. Houma Well Service, supra, the Fifth Circuit refused to consider Levy
as controlling, saying:
It is one thing to hold, as did Levy, that a state may not constitutionally pro-
hibit recovery by an illegitimate child where the defense was the status of the
claimant. . . . It is quite another to say that where competition arises be-
tween statutory beneficiaries [some of whom claim the other Is illegitimate,
though born in wedlock] the Constitution requires full inquiry into biological
facts in disregard of settled policies which would uphold family-home against
the perils of illegitimizing frequently Innocent, nearly always defenseless minors
at the hands of unrelated contestants for the spoils of a death claim.
413 F.2d at 512. Emphasis added.
115. Brief for Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law at 6, Labine v. Vincent, No. 5257,
October Term, 1970.
ers who have non-marital sexual relations. The economic need of the
children, their age, their other means of support are all irrelevant.
The standard is the so-called immorality of the mother. ... I would
say that the immorality of the mother has no rational connection with
the need of her children under any welfare program.1
6
Similarly, it is evident that no rational relation, much less a compelling
justification, can be presented by a policy which punishes the children for
their father's and mother's offenses against public morality. Such state
action merely succeeds in punishing a scapegoat, and an extremely vul-
nerable one at that: A child.
One argument in favor of intestacy laws is that they are legislative
enactments of what would presumably be the intent of the decedent had
he left a will."' A subsequent assumption is that by not writing a will,
the decedent intended that intestacy law should apply to the distribu-
tion of his estate. Such an assumption may be theoretically useful, but in
application to reality its utility is limited by the factor that few laymen
know the intricacies of intestacy law; it may be suggested that an illegiti-
mate father who knows of the existence of intestacy laws may assume that
where such laws mention succession to his children, his illetimate chil-
dren are contemplated as well as those, if any, of his children who are
legitimate. Yet a state may valdily presume such in its law, subject only
to constitutional guarantees.
While a father may, by will, disinherit his child, be he legitimate or
illegitimate, one serious question remains: Where a state discriminates
against such a child on the basis of their ancestry, race, or status, may
the state effectuate that discrimination by attributing it to the presumed
intent of the decedent? Such action by the state is prohibited discrimina-
tion, regardless of on whom intent to discriminate is placed, and cannot
be tolerated. 1 8 In 1967 the Supreme Court, in Reitman v. Mulkey
1 9
discussed the problem of state involvement in private discrimination:
'This Court has never attempted the "impossible task" of formulating
an infallible test for determining whether the State "in any of its
manifestations" has become involved in private discrimination. "Only
by sifting the facts and weighing the circumstances" on a case-by-case
basis can a "nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct
be attributed its true significance." 120
As to illegitimate children, the state is "nonobviously" involved in dis-
crimination which by statutory fiat it asserts to be based on an individual's
intent. To call such governmental action "private" is to beg the question;
were it not for the state-created presumption, there would be no sweep-
ing discrimination against illegitimate children. Whether such intent is
considered that of the private person or not is irrelevant; state action has
institutionalized that intent and by that institutionalization has discrimi-
116. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309. 334, 336 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring). Emphasis
added.
117. 1 Bowe-Parker: Page on Wills 1 1.6 at 20 (3rd ed. 1960).
118. Shelley v. Kraemer, supra.
119. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
120. Id. at 329.
nated against all illegitimates. 12 1 To state that prviate discrimination can-
not be prevented,122 and that, therefore, the state may validate it consti-
tutionally by legislative enactment is sheer sophistry; such cyclical rea-
soning should not be permitted to obfuscate the essential intent of the
state in presuming the intestate's intent. The state cannot be allowed to
discriminate in this sophisticated and subtle manner against a group that
it dare not openly inveigh against on racial or other grounds.
VI. Protecting the Illegitimate Child: Necessary
Statutory Reform.
Despite the above arguments, it is apparent that judicial reform in
the area of illegitimacy and intestacy is unlikely, due to the Labine deci-
sion. Thus, it is incumbent upon the states 123 to rectify the discriminations
now imposed upon the illegitimate child. There is nothing difficult in
the enactment of statutes which would carefully limit and delineate the
manner of proving paternity, which is the most crucial step, and which
would require such proof for the child to inherit. For instance, today
the means of establishing paternity have broadened from the traditional
blood test, which could prove only that the putative father was not the
father, to the technique of "serotyping" or blood typing 124 which iso-
lates genetic factors in the blood of the father and the mother and con-
clusively prove paternity. Use of this technique obviates fears that the
wrong man will be held to be the father. Similarly, a state might require
that paternity be established within a limited time after the birth of the
child, during the life of the father, so as to facilitate immediate discovery
of paternity.. This would negate fears that a claimant would appear after
the death of the putative father, with the consequent difficulty in estab-
lishing paternity when that putative father is unable to refute the alle-
gations of the claimant. 125
In order to protect the illegitimate child from the vagaries of life,
which have already been inflicted upon him by negligent parents, it is
necessary that the legislatures of the states attempt to rectify their laws.
Such statutes may take several forms, but each should attempt to maxi-
mize the benefits of children generally, while limiting those benefits only
to those who deserve them. However, the concepts of the thirteenth cen-
tury as to who is deserving should be eliminated, and the maturing ideals
of the twentieth century of equality should replace them.
Such statutory reform, it is suggested, must consider several closely
related problems. The first, of course,, is the central problem of allowing
the illegitimate to be treated equally with his legitimate half-siblings in
121. By analogy, if a state were to statutorily and openly discriminate on a racial basis.
whether or not the state considered that discrimination to rightly be the presumed intent
of its populace would be constitutionally irrelevant; the statute would obviously fall on
equal protection grounds.
122. But see Shelley v. Kraemer, supra.
123. 91 S.Ct. 1025 n. 16.
124. Note, Illegitimacy: Equal Protection and How to Enjoy It, 4 Ga.L.Rev. 383 (1970).
125. See generally Krause, Bringing the Bastard into the Great Society: A Proposed Uniform
Act on Legitimacy. 44 Tex.L.Rev. 829 (1966).
successions to his father's estate. But integral in this problem is deter-
mining precisely what is an illegitimate child, and exactly who are to be
considered as his parents. For it may appear desirable that adoptive par-
ents should alone be considered the "parents" of an adopted child; simi-
larly, it is also desirable that a child born during his mother's marriage,
but born due to modern techniques of artificial insemination be consid-
ered as the child of his mother's husband.
To that end, the following model state statute is proposed to rectify
some of the confusions now presented in the law, as well as correcting
such decisions as the Labine case:
A MODEL ACT ON ILLEGITIMACY
Be it enacted by the [Legislature] of the State of
Section 1. Definitions.
As used in this act -
(1) The term "natural parents" means the natural father and the nat-
ural mother of a child, provided that the term "natural parent" shall
not include the natural father of a child conceived by any method of
artificial insemination which was consented to in a duly notarized affi-
davit by the spouse of the natural mother who shall be conclusively
deemed to be the natural father of the child.
(2) The term "natural child" means any child of its natural parents.
Section 2. Intestate Successions.
(1) For purposes of intestate successions under the laws of this State,
all natural children shall inherit from and through their natural par-
ents, equally one with the others;
(2) For purposes of intestate successions under the laws of this State,
all natural parents shall inherit from and through their natural chil-
dren, except that any natural parent who grants adoptive rights to any
adoptive parent thereby releases any rights that said natural parent
may have or may have had to inherit from said child.
Section 3. Determination o Paternity.
In any case where natural parents of a child are not married to each
other, the paternity of a child for purposes of intestate succession
may be determined by any one of the following procedures;
(1) By establishing paternity by an adjudication before the death of
the father
[Optional] [or within one year thereafter], by clear and convincing
proof;
(2) If the father publicly acknowledges the child as his own, by filing
a duly notarized affidavit with the clerk of [the court having probate
jurisdiction] at the place of residence of the natural mother, in which
the father acknowledges the child as his own;
(3) If the father publicly receives the child as his own into his family,
with the consent of his wife if he is married, or otherwise openly and
publicly treats it as his own.
Section 1 of this act definies, not children alone, but parents so that
each child is the child of its natural parents. In subsection (1), there is
a limitation excluding artificial insemination donors from parenthood.
This is intended to prevent later claims of the child against the donor,
and is in line with decisions concerning legitimacy of adulterous bas-
tards. 126 Moreover, it prevents the consenting spouse from later dis-
avowing paternity, to the detriment of the child, by requiring a written
consent to the insemination. Subsection (2) defines "natural child" so
that every child, except as otherwise limited, has a full complement of
parents.
Section 2(1) allows all natural children to inherit from their natural
parents, regardless of their legitimacy or illegitimacy. Significantly, it
allows a child to inherit from its natural parents, even where the child
might later be adopted. To do otherwise would violate due process of
law,' 28 by divesting a child of a right without giving him a voice in the
matter.
Section 2(3) and 2(4) allow the parents of natural, if illegitimate,
children the right to inherit from those children, unless the natural par-
ent granted adoptive rights to the child to other and subsequent adoptive
parents. Such is reasonable, for it recognizes the fact that parents must
support children, and that if children die without other heirs, the parents
have a right to share in the child's estate, unless they divested themselves
of the duty to raise the child, as where a mother and a father put chil-
dren up for adoption.
Section 3 provides for determination of paternity in three separate
ways. Subsection (1) provides that a paternity proceeding may determine
paternity sufficient for intestacy purposes. The optional provision recog-
nizes that "clear and convincing" proof may be presumed to be lacking
after the putative father has been dead for more than one year.
Subsection (2) provides a voluntary mode of acknowledgement by
the father.
129
Subsection (3), modeled after the law of the Virgin Islands,
130 miti-
gates the effects on a child of a common law marriage, and allows a child
to inherit when his father has openly, if not formally, recognized him
as his own.
In light of the fact that it appears that a judicial recognizance of the
inequality of illegitimate children is unlikely, at least for some time, be-
cause of the Labine decision, it is incumbent upon the legislatures of the
states to rectify the problem by their own acts. Should they fail to do so,
the successive problems of immorality and poverty can only be aggra-
vated. It remains to the states, as Justice Frankfurter noted, to note the
"special place in life which law should reflect." 131
Russ E. Boltz
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